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Abstract
The Ad Types Problem (without gap rules) is a special case of the assignment
problem in which there are k types of nodes on one side (the ads), and an ordered set
of nodes on the other side (the slots). The edge weight of an ad i of type θ to slot j is
vi · α
θ
j where vi is an advertiser-specific value and each ad type θ has a discount curve
α
(θ)
1 ≥ α
(θ)
2 ≥ ... ≥ 0 over the slots that is common for ads of type θ. We present two
contributions for this problem: 1) we give an algorithm that finds the maximum weight
matching that runs in O(n2(k + log n)) time for n slots and n ads of each type—cf.
O(kn3) when using the Hungarian algorithm—, and 2) we show to do VCG pricing
in asymptotically the same time, namely O(n2(k+ log n)), and apply reserve prices in
O(n3(k + log n)).
The Ad Types Problem (with gap rules) includes a matrix G such that after we
show an ad of type θi, the next Gij slots cannot show an ad of type θj. We show that
the problem is hard to approximate within k1−ǫ for any ǫ > 0 (even without discount
curves) by reduction from Maximum Independent Set. On the positive side, we show
a Dynamic Program formulation that solves the problem (including discount curves)
optimally and runs in O(k · n2k+1) time.
1 Introduction
In online advertising, there is a hugely influential literature on sponsored search [41, 11, 29].
In this setting, a small number of ads (typically 2 or 3) are shown next to organic search
results using a position auction [41, 11]. Since users tend to look at the results from top to
bottom, an ad will have a higher click-through-rate (CTR) in a higher slot, and are therefore
higher slots rae considered more valuable. The common way to capture this slot effect is
with a separable model, where ad slots have an associated discount 1 ≥ α1 ≥ .. ≥ 0 that
represents the advertiser-agnostic CTR of the slot. The auction is run taking the expected
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number of clicks (as represented by αj) as the “quantity of good” that is sold. Work in this
area has proliferated and the position auction model lies at the basis of many applications
of online advertising, even outside of sponsored search.
While the position auction model has been very influential in online advertising, there are
important differences between the multi-slot ad allocation problem on a search results page
and the multi-slot problem in content feeds like Facebook’s News Feed, reddit, and Apple
News. In content feeds, ads are interspersed with organic content, so not all ads are visible
from the start, and when the first ad is shown it is not clear how many ads will have to be
allocated.1 Moreover, there are many different types of organic content like text, photos,
and videos mixed in the same stream. Similarly, there are many different types of ads that
have different associated objectives: some ads simply want the user to see them, others want
the user to click or view a video. These objectives must be considered when allocating slots
to ads, since the probability that a user will see an impression-ad is quite different from the
probability that she’ll watch a video ad or click on a link-click ad. There may be diversity
rules as well that after a video ad you cannot show another video ad, but it’s okay to show
a banner ad. These considerations have implications on which ads are eligible to be shown
in which slots.
The standard position auction model fails to capture these important differences. For
example, the probability of a user watching a video ad typically decays differently than a
link-click ad. If one were to use the same discount curve for ads of different types, this could
lead to a suboptimal allocation:
Example 1.1. Suppose we have a setting with 2 ad types, link-click ads and video ads, two
ad slots, and we have discount curve α1 =
1
2
, α2 =
1
4
. These discounts are accurate for
link-click ads (i.e. α
(link)
1 =
1
2
, α
(link)
2 =
1
4
), but for video ads, the user is more likely to watch
the video in the second slot than they are to click a link in that slot: α
(video)
1 =
1
2
, α
(video)
2 =
1
3
.
Consider a video ad with bid $12 and a link-click ad with bid $10. The optimal allocation
assuming that discount curve α is accurate for both ads would assign the video ad to slot 1
and the link-click ad to slot 2 for total value 1
2
· $12 + 1
4
· $10 = $8.50. However, switching
the ads yields total value 1
2
· $10 + 1
3
· $12 = $9 > $8.50.2
In this paper we propose a new theoretical model for online advertising that addresses
these issues. It captures the position auction as a special case, but can handle discount curves
for multiple types and intersperse advertising with organic content in a dynamic manner.3
An Ad Types Problem instance has k ad types, that each have their own discount curve over
n slots, i.e. for each ad type θ we have a discount curve α
(θ)
1 ≥ α
(θ)
2 ≥ . . . ≥ α
(θ)
n ≥ 0 that
1While this may not be a problem when deciding which ad to show the user, pricing generally needs
information about how many items are sold, and what the other competition is in the auction.
2Those familiar with auction theory will note that this also implies that VCG prices w.r.t. α would not
be incentive compatible. For readers less familiar with auction theory, we provide a primer in Section 2.1.
3While our motivation for studying this problem comes from online advertising in content streams, it
captures many other interesting settings that are unrelated to online advertising. For example, the setting
without gap rules can model a worker with different time slots and jobs of different types that need to be
done; jobs are most valuable when completed early and delays for jobs of the same type are discounted
similarly. Adding gap rules can model the cost of moving between locations (in the physical world) or
context-switching (in the digital world).
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represents the slot-specific action-rate for ads of type θ. All ad types agree on the order of
the slots. Gap rules are modeled by a k × k matrix G, which indicates for each pair of ad
types (θi, θj), that after showing an ad of type θi, the next Gij stories cannot be of type θj .
We first focus on the special case where G = 0, i.e. different ad types have different
discount curves but there are no constraints on the gaps between ads. In this setting, the
Ad Types Problem is a special case of the maximum-weight bipartite matching problem
(also known as the assignment problem), so we could find an optimal allocation using the
Hungarian algorithm in O(kn3) time [37] (where k is the number of ads, n the number of slots,
and we have n ads per type). Our first result is an algorithm that finds the optimal allocation
in O(n2(k + logn)) time, saving a linear factor. In auctions, it’s not only important to find
the optimal allocation of ads to slots, one also needs to compute appropriate prices. We show
that we can compute VCG prices in asymptotically the same time as finding the optimal
allocation, i.e. O(n2(k + log n)). A common way to control revenue is to set an appropriate
minimum bid (also knows as a reserve price [34]); we show that we can compute incentive-
compatible prices with advertiser-specific reserve prices for all ads in O(n3(k + logn)) time.
Next we consider the more general Ad Types problem with both discount curves and gap
rules (where G 6= 0). We show that the problem is hard to approximate within k1−ǫ for any
ǫ > 0 (even without discount curves) by reduction from Maximum Independent Set. On the
positive side, we show a Dynamic Program formulation that solves the problem (including
discount curves) optimally and runs in O(k · n2k+1) time.
1.1 Related Work
Assignment Problem. The maximum-weight bipartite matching problem, also known
as the assignment problem, is a classical problem in operations research. Let (A,B,E) be
a complete bipartite graph with edges weights v : E → R+, and V = A ∪ B the set of
nodes; the goal is to find a matching M of maximal total weight
∑
e∈M v(e). Kuhn [28]
proposed an algorithm for this problem—which he called the Hungarian algorithm—based
on ideas by Ko˝nig and Egerva´ry, though he only proved that the algorithm would terminate,
not what the time complexity is. Munkres [32] showed that the time complexity of the
Hungarian algorithm is O(|V |4). Edmonds and Karp [12] gave a O(|V |3) time algorithm
for balanced graphs, and Ramshaw and Tarjan [37] more recently gave an algorithm for
unbalanced graphs (wlog assume |A| < |B|) that runs in O(|E||A|+ |A|2 log |A|). Since the
seminal work on the assignment problem, there has been active research into relevant special
cases. In particular there is a line of work on convex bipartite graphs, where the right side
of the graph is ordered, and nodes on the left can only be connected to a single contiguous
block of nodes on the right. For the unweighted case, a line of work starting with Glover
[19, 30, 15] shows that the problem can be solved in time linear in the number of nodes
O(|V |). General weights are not considered, though early work on vertex-weighted bipartite
graphs (where each node i has an associated weight wi and the weight of an edge from i to
j is wij = wi + wj) yield a O(|E|+ |B| log |A|) time algorithm [25]. More recently, Plaxton
[35, 36] showed that Two-Directional Orthogonal Ray Graphs (a generalization of convex
graphs) admit a O(|V | log |V |) time algorithm.
Sharathkumar and Agarwal [40] consider a more general set of edge weights, where nodes
are embedding in d-dimensional space, and the weights of the complete bipartite graph are
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all either the L1 or L∞ metric. They present an algorithm to solve the maximum weight
bipartite in O(|V |3/2 logd+O(1)(|V |) log∆), where ∆ is the diameter of the space that contains
the points.
None of the results on specializations cover The Ad Types Problem setting (even without
gap rules).
Ad Auctions. The simple separable model for position auctions appears in Varian [41]
and Edelman et al. [11]. One body of related work relaxes the assumption that action rates
are separable. One common theme is to model externalities between ads (also related to our
gap rules) [26, 16, 18, 3, 2, 20, 17]. Of note, [26, 16, 13, 2] study algorithms for computing
allocations in models where the user’s attention cascades and prove hardness results. A
different generalization is to allow arbitrary action rates that are still independent between
ads [1, 6, 5], which corresponds to the Ad Type Problem (without gap rules) where each ad
has a unique type.
Another generalization of the basic position auction allows ads to be placed in complex
ways. A few papers study mechanisms that permit presentation constraints and/or ads with
variable presentation [23, 4, 22, 33, 8]. Mahdian et al. study auctions for ads displayed on
maps along with organic results [31] (since places of interest are connected to a physical
location, this imposes constraints on where ads can be placed).
Finally, the connections between ad auctions and max-weight matching (and the Hun-
garian algorithm) have been studied before as well [9, 5, 27, 10].
1.2 Contributions
This paper presents three main contributions:
• Optimal Allocation. Firstly, we give an algorithm to optimally solve the Ad Types
problem without gap rules. This setting is a special case of the assignment problem with
applications beyond ad auctions. Our algorithm is a specialization of the Hungarian
algorithm to find the maximum-weight matching in the bipartite graph that uses the
structure of the Ad Types Problem to run in O(n2(k + log n)) time (compared to
O(kn3) for running the Hungarian algorithm on the instance; Theorem 3.1). While we
are motivated by ad auctions, this setting also models other common settings like a
worker who needs to do several tasks of different types.
• Pricing. Secondly, we show that we can do incentive-compatible pricing in this setting
with minimal overhead. First we show how to compute VCG prices efficiently. Naively,
VCG prices are computed by resolving the original problem n times (removing 1 buyer
in each instance). We show that we can extract VCG prices from the dual variables in
our algorithm when they are properly updated. This yields VCG prices in O(n2(k +
logn)) time (cf. O(n3(k+logn) when implemented naively; Theorem 3.6). Second, we
show that we can apply reserve prices (and in fact in all single-parameter environments)
without a changepoint algorithm [34, 38]. For our case, this yields a O(n3(k + log n))
time algorithm (Corollary 3.9).
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• Gap Rules. Finally, we consider the more general Ad Types problem with both
discount curves and gap rules (where G 6= 0). We show that the problem is hard to
approximate within k1−ǫ for any ǫ > 0 (even without discount curves) by reduction from
Maximum Independent Set (Theorem 4.1). On the positive side, we give a Dynamic
Program formulation that solves the problem (including discount curves) optimally
and runs in O(k · n2k+1) time (Theorem 4.2).
2 Preliminaries
In this section we give a primer on auction theory, a formal definition of the ad types problem,
and a review of the Hungarian Algorithm and its application to Ad Types problem.
2.1 Auction Theory
There are n (strategic) agents, and some finite set of outcomes Ω. Agents have some value
function over outcomes: vi : Ω → R. An auction A = (X ,P) consists of an allocation
function X : (Ω → R)n → Ω that takes the bids (meaning a report of the valuation) of n
agents and selects the outcome, and a payment function P : (Ω→ R)n → R.
A common goal4 for the auctioneer is to select the outcome ω∗ with the maximal total
value, which is known as the social welfare: ω∗ = argmaxω∈Ω
∑n
i=1 vi(ω). Note however, that
the auctioneer doesn’t have direct access to the valuation function vi; she elicits them as bids
bi. Each agent cares about their own utility, ui(bi, b−i) = vi(X (bi, b−i)) − P(bi, b−i), where
b−i are the bids of all agents except i. Thus, given bids by the other agents bi she will report
b∗i = argmaxbi ui(bi, b−i). The auctioneer can use the pricing function to incentivize agents
to report their true valuations. An auction is called dominant strategy incentive compatible
(DSIC), or simply incentive compatible, if for any bid profile b−i of agents other than i, agent
i always maximizes their utility by bidding truthfully: vi ∈ argmaxbi ui(bi, bi−1)). Celebrated
work by Vickrey, Clarke and Groves [42, 7, 21] shows that it is always possible to do this by
charging agents their externality.
A particularly interesting class of valuation functions are single-parameter in the following
sense: there is some function xi : Ω → R
+ that maps outcomes to a “quantity of goods”
that agent i receives. The valuation function is then expressed as vi(ω) = vi · xi(ω), where
we overload vi to be a single “value-per-unit-good” parameter. Single-parameter settings
are quite common, e.g. single-item auction are single parameter: an agent has a value vi for
receiving the good, the outcome space consists of the item going to each of the agents that
participate, and xi(ω) = 1 iff agent i receives the good in outcome ω and it is 0 otherwise.
For single-parameter environments the allocation function X and pricing function P take as
input a single number for each advertiser: their per-unit bid bi ∈ R.
Besides social welfare, a common goal for an auctioneer is to maximize revenue. Myerson
[34] shows how to maximize expected revenue in single-parameter environments when a
buyer has knowledge about the distributions F1, F2, ..., Fn from which each buyer draws
their value. For a buyer i whose distribution Fi is regular—meaning φi(v) := v−
1−Fi(v)
fi(v)
with
CDF Fi and corresponding PDF fi is monotonically non-decreasing—the optimal expected
4Other common goals include revenue and a notion of high-value allocation with fairness concerns.
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revenue from that buyer is obtained by setting reserve price ri (also known as a minimum
bid) equal to φ−1(0).5 To apply a reserve price ri, let xi(bi; b−i) be the quantity of goods
that a single-parameter buyer receives. If bi < ri the buyer is rejected from the auction
and thus receives nothing; otherwise xi is identical to the setting without reserve price ri.
The incentive-compatible price corresponding to xi is given by Myerson’s payment identity:
pi =
∫ bi
b=0
b · x′i(b; b−i) db. For discrete xi, this becomes a summation over the changepoints
where the allocation changes.
2.2 The Ad Types Problem
The Ad Types Problem involves computing an allocation of a set of N ads to n ≤ N slots.
Ads come in one of k different ad types θl, for l ∈ {1, ..., k}. We let the ads of type θl be
a
(θl)
i for i ∈ 1, . . . , nl. There are three main components to the definition of the problem:
• Valuations. Ad i of type θ has a value-per-conversion (a.k.a. value-per-action) v
(θ)
i .
Ads of different types have different conversion events, e.g. for a display ad the con-
version event is a view, for a link ad the conversion event is a link click, and for a video
ad the conversion event is the user watching video ad. For each ad type θ, we index
the ads in non-increasing order of valuation, i.e. v
(θ)
1 ≥ v
(θ)
2 ≥ . . . ≥ v
(θ)
nl ≥ 0.
• Discount curves. We assume a separable model for discount curves where we can
write Pr[conversion on ad i (of type θ) in slot j] = αθj · βi where α
θ
j is the slot effect
for a particular ad type θ (e.g., the probability that a user will watch a video ad if
its shown in the jth slot) and βi is the advertiser quality (this separable model is also
standard in position auctions [41, 11]). In the remainder of the paper we assume wlog
that the advertiser effect has already been included in the advertiser’s value, i.e., if the
value-per-conversion of the advertiser is v′i, then vi = βi · v
′
i. We further abuse notation
to let vij = α
θ
j · vi for ad i of type θ in slot j.
Discounts are monotonically non-increasing, and all ad types agree on the order of
slots, i.e. for each ad type θ, we have α
(θ)
1 ≥ α
(θ)
2 ≥ . . . ≥ α
(θ)
n ≥ 0.
• Gap rules. When ads are interspersed with organic content, there must be some way
to control how many ads are shown. In the simplest case, where there’s only one type
of ad, this can be implemented by a gap rule g, which states that two ads must be at
least g slots apart from each other. When there are multiple ad types, there is a k× k
matrix G, which indicates for each pair of ad types (θi, θj), that after showing an ad
of type θi, the next Gij stories cannot be of type θj .
The Ad Types Problem is to find a social welfare maximizing allocation that obeys the
gap rules.
5Myerson also extends the results to non-regular distributions, though that is outside the scope of the
present work. Setting the optimal reserve price for a non-regular distribution is still guaranteed to be within
a factor 2 of optimal, see e.g. [39].
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2.3 The Hungarian Algorithm
The Hungarian Algorithm [28, 32] is a classical algorithm for computing a maximum weight
matching in a bipartite graph. Starting from a trivial primal solution (empty matching) and
a trivial dual solution, the algorithm iteratively increases the cardinality of the matching
while improving the value of the dual solution until the value of the primal solution equals
that of the dual.
Let (U, V, E) be a complete bipartite graph with edges weights v : E → R+. The
primal/dual pair of linear programs capturing the problem are as follows.
maximize
∑
(i,j)∈E vijxij
subject to
∑
j xij ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ U∑
i xij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ V
xij ≥ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ E
minimize
∑
i∈U ui +
∑
j∈V pj
subject to ui + pj ≥ vij ∀(i, j) ∈ E
ui ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ U
pj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ V
The algorithm starts from an empty primal solution M = ∅, and a trivial feasible dual
solution ui = 0 for all i ∈ U and pj = max(i,j)∈E vij for all j ∈ V . In each iteration, the
algorithm identifies the set of tight edges T = {(i, j) ∈ E : ui + pj = vij} and builds an
alternating BFS tree B (also known as Hungarian tree) in (U, V, T ) out of the free vertices
in V . If the alternating tree contains an augmenting path A, we augment M with A thus
increasing its cardinality; if no such path is available, we can update the dual solution by
reducing the dual value of V ∩B and increasing the dual value of U ∩B by the same amount
until a new edge become tight. This update maintains feasibility while reducing the value
of the dual solution and makes at least one new edge tight, which in turn allows us to grow
the alternating tree further.
Throughout the execution of the algorithm we maintain the invariants that the dual
solution is feasible and that the edges in the matching M are tight. As a result, at the
end of the algorithm we have a matching whose weight equals the value of the dual feasible
solution, which acts as a certificate of its optimality.
Using the right data structures, it is possible to implement the algorithm so that the
amount of work done between each update to M is O(|E|+ |U | log |U |). Therefore, if we let
M∗ be a maximum weight matching, then the Hungarian algorithm can be implemented to
run in O(|M∗|(|E|+ |U | log |U |)) time [14].
3 Ad Types Problem without Gap Rules
In this section we consider the ad types problem with discount curves but no gap rules.
In this model we have k ad types, and each ad type has its own monotonically decreasing
7
discount curve α
(θl)
j for l ∈ 1, 2, . . . , k. Without gap rules, the problem becomes a simple
maximum weight bipartite assignment on a complete graph with N vertices (ads) on one
side of the bipartition and n vertices (slots) on the other side of the bipartition, with n < N .
Therefore, the Hungarian algorithm can solve this problem in O(Nn2) time. We will assume
throughout there are exactly n ads of each type6, hence the Hungarian algorithm runs in
O(kn3) time.
In this section we start by giving an algorithm that finds the maximum-weight bipartite
matching in O(n2(k+logn)) time (Section 3.1). We show that in some sense the dependency
on k can be expected: when k = n, the problem is no easier than solving the assignment
problem (i.e. a common order of the slots does not improve the running time; see Section 3.2).
We then turn our attention to pricing and show that computing VCG prices can be done
in O(n2(k + logn)) (Section 3.3 and that we can apply reserve prices in O(n3(k + log n))
(Section 3.4).
3.1 Finding the Optimal Allocation
We present an adaptation of the Hungarian algorithm [28, 32] that exploits the special
structure of the Ad Types problem. In the following we use the language of markets to
describe the Hungarian algorithm: the dual variable of a slot j corresponds to a price pj ,
while a dual variable of an advertiser i corresponds to the utility ui of the advertiser if
they get an item out their demand set (given the prices) [10]. Moreover, the instance is a
complete bipartite graph with ads on one side and slots on the other side where the weight
of the edge (i, j) is vij . The maximum-weight matching in the bipartite graph corresponds
to the social-welfare maximizing allocation of ads to slots. For ease of exposition, we assume
that values and discounts are monotonically strictly decreasing, this restriction can be lifted
by consistent tie-breaking.
Algorithm 1 shows how to compute the optimal allocation in an Ad Types instance. The
algorithm is identical to how the Hungarian algorithm is commonly implemented; the only
difference is how we maintain the set of possible new edges in Lines 6 and 13. The algorithm
initializes the dual solution (u, p) to be feasible, and starts with an empty matching M .
Algorithm considers slots in descending order in each iteration of the for loop in Line 3; we
call each such iteration a phase.
During each phase we iteratively update the dual variables until we find an augmenting
path to increase the size of the matching M by one. In each of these iterations within a
phase we explore a tight edge leading to a matched edge and both edges are added to our
alternating tree. Every time we add a new matched slot j′ to the alternating tree we explore
the edges incident on j′ using the routine UpdatePossibleNewEdges, which scan the
edges incident on j′ and works out which edges are tight and when the remaining edges will
become tight. All these new edges are stored in a priority queue for later retrieval.
High-level running time analysis. Even though the algorithm is not well defined yet
(we have not specified how to implement UpdatePossibleNewEdges), still we can say
6If an ad type has fewer than n ads, we can append ads with value 0, if there are more than n ads of a
type, with loss of generality we can restrict attention to the n highest-value ads.
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Algorithm 1 Hungarian algorithm for the Ad Types problem.
Input: Values v
(θ)
1 > v
(θ)
2 > ... > 0, and discounts α
(θ)
1 > α
(θ)
2 > ... > 0 for each ad type θ.
Output: Matching M that maximizes
∑
(i,j)∈M vij.
1: Initialize the dual solution so that
◦ ui ← 0 for all ads i,
◦ pj ← max vi′,j′ for all slots j.
2: Let M ← ∅ be the matching.
3: for slot j in descending order do
4: Let B ← {j} be an alternating BFS tree
5: Let P be an empty priority queue
6: P ← UpdatePossibleNewEdges(P, v, α,M, j)
7: while B does not contain an alternating path do
8: (i′, j′)← remove from P next tight edge
9: ∆← vi′j′ − ui′ − pj′ // note that ∆ could be 0
10: Implicitly update the dual solution so that
◦ ui′′ ← ui′′ +∆ for all ads i
′′ ∈ B,
◦ pj′′ ← pj′′ −∆ for all slots j
′′ ∈ B.
11: if i′ is matched in M then
12: B ← B ∪ {(i′, j′), (i′,M(i′))}
13: UpdatePossibleNewEdges(P, v, α,M(i′))
14: else
15: B ← B ∪ {(i′, j′)} // now we have an augmenting path
16: end if
17: end while
18: A← alternating path in B
19: M ← AddAlternatingPath(M,A).
20: explicitly update the dual solution (u, p)
21: end for
9
something about the running time of the algorithm.
Each phase is implemented using a priority queue P over some of the ads not in B.
For each ad i′ in P we keep track of the next edge (i′, j′) that would become tight given
the current structure of B. The priority of i′ captures when this next edge becomes tight,
the smaller the priority the sooner it becomes tight; similarly, if i′ already has a tight edge
incident on itself then it should have the smallest priority in the queue.
In the normal implementation of the Hungarian Algorithm, the procedure UpdatePos-
sibleNewEdges(P, v, α, j′) iterates over all edges (i′, j′) incident on j′. If i′ ∈ B we can
ignore the edge as i′ has already been discovered and its slack vi′,j′ −αj′ −ui′ will not change
with future updates (since now both i′ and j′ belong to B). If i′ /∈ B then we compute its
current slack vi′,j′ −αj′ −ui′ to work out when it will become tight and compare this against
the time of the current next tight edge incident on i′, which we may need to update.
Without making any assumptions on the structure of the valuations, in the worst case
in each iteration of the while loop in Line 7 we perform O(nk + log nk) = O(nk) work
(assuming a Fibonacci heap implementation for P ) since there are kn ads in total and kn
edges incident on j′ (one per ad). In each iteration be grow B by adding one new matched
edge, so we have at most j iterations of the while loop. Therefore, the overall running time
is O(
∑n
j=1 jnk) = O(n
3k).
However, we can come up with a more efficient implementation of UpdatePossible-
NewEdges(P, v, α, j′) that exploits the special structure of our valuation function so that P
holds at most n+k ads and only O(k) edges incident on j′ need to be scanned without sacri-
ficing the overall correctness of the algorithm. With this improvement in performance, each
iteration of the while loop in Line 7 takes at most O(logn + k) work. Again, since in each
iteration be grow B by adding one new matched edge, we have at most j iteration of the
while loop. Therefore, the overall running time is O(
∑n
j=1 j(k + log n)) = O(n
2(k + log n)).
Theorem 3.1. Given an input with k ad types and n slots, Algorithm 1 can be implemented
to run in time O(n2(k + log n)).
Our goal for the the rest of this section is to provide an implementation UpdatePos-
sibleNewEdges(P, v, α, j′) where the size of P is always at most n + k and only O(k)
edges are considered in each invocation of the routine. Key to our analysis is the observation
that tight edges cannot cross is the following sense: Given two ads i < i′ of the same type
θ, and two slots j < j′, then we cannot have the edge from ad i to slot j′ be tight, and
simultaneously have the edge from ad i′ to j be tight.
Lemma 3.2 (Non-crossing lemma). Given two ads i < i′ of the same type θ, and two slots
j < j′, if vi > vi′ and α
(θ)
j > α
(θ)
j′ then in any feasible dual solution we cannot have the edge
from ad i to slot j′ be tight, and simultaneously have the edge from ad i′ to j be tight.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. If the edges between i and j′ and i′ and j are both tight,
then we must have dual variables ui, ui′, pj, pj′ such that
α
(θ)
j′ · vi = ui + pj′
α
(θ)
j · vi′ = ui′ + pj
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At the same time, due to the slackness constraints, we must have that
α
(θ)
j · vi ≤ ui + pj
α
(θ)
j′ · vi′ ≤ ui′ + pj′.
We can combine these and obtain
α
(θ)
j′ · vi + α
(θ)
j · vi′ = ui + pj′ + ui′ + pj
≥ α
(θ)
j · vi + α
(θ)
j′ · vi′ .
Which is false due to the standard exchange argument. We give the argument for complete-
ness: Rearranging we have (α
(θ)
j − α
(θ)
j′ ) · (vi − vi′) ≤ 0; however, due to strict monotonicity
α
(θ)
j > α
(θ)
j′ and vi > vi′ , so have reached a contradiction.
3.1.1 UpdatePossibleNewEdges
The goal of UpdatePossibleNewEdges(P, v, α, j′) is to iterate over the edges incident
on j′ that are tight or that can potentially become tight later in the execution of the current
phase. For each such edge (i′, j′) we compare its slack with the priority associated with i′
and update the entry for i′ in P accordingly if needed.
The exact definition of the edges inspected is given by Algorithm 2. Instead of describing
how this works, let us make some observations about the set of edges that can potentially
become tight, and then we shall see that the Algorithm indeed considers all these edges.
For each ad type θ we first consider the edges of the form (a
(θ)
i , j
′) where a
(θ)
i is matched
and M(a
(θ)
i ) < j
′. We claim that we only need to consider the largest such i. Recall that
all the edges in M are tight and remain tight throughout the execution of the phase; in
particular, (a
(θ)
i ,M(a
(θ)
i )) is tight and remains tight. Thus, any edge (a
(θ)
i′ , j
′) with i′ < i)
is not tight and will never become tight due the Non-crossing Lemma 3.2 and the fact that
i′ < i and M(a
(θ)
i ) < j
′.
Now consider the edges of the form (a
(θ)
i , j
′) where a
(θ)
i is matched and M(a
(θ)
i ) > j
′. We
claim that we only need to consider the smallest such i. Recall that all the edges in M are
tight and remain tight throughout the execution of the phase; in particular, (a
(θ)
i ,M(a
(θ)
i ))
is tight and remains tight. Thus, any edge (a
(θ)
i′ , j
′) with i′ > i is not tight and will never
become tight due the Non-crossing Lemma 3.2 and the fact that i′ > i and M(a
(θ)
i ) > j
′.
Finally, we need to consider edges of the form (a
(θ)
i , j
′) where a
(θ)
i is unmatched. We claim
that we only need to consider the smallest such i available7. Indeed, for any other i′ > i
note that v
(θ)
i > v
(θ)
i′ and since the u variable of both ads is 0 (only slots that are part of an
alternating tree get their dual variables increased and those are always matched) the slack of
(a
(θ)
i , j
′) will always be smaller than the slack of (a
(θ)
i′ , j
′) since v
(θ)
i α
(θ)
j′ − pj′ < v
(θ)
i′ α
(θ)
j′ − pj′.
Furthermore, notice that if the edge (a
(θ)
i , j
′) become tight, then we immediately have an
augmenting path in B, which concludes the phase.
It is easy to see that these three cases are precisely those covered by Algorithm 2.
7It is worth noting that even this case can be ignored if there exists a matched a
(θ)
i
such thatM(a
(θ)
i
) > j′;
however, for ease of presentation we add the slot to X even if such a
(θ)
i
exists.
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Algorithm 2 UpdatePossibleNewEdges
Input: P, v, α,M, j′
1: X ← ∅
2: for ad type θ do
3: let a
(θ)
i be the unmatched ad of type θ with smallest i
4: add a
(θ)
i to X
5: if exists matched ad a
(θ)
i such that M(a
(θ)
i ) < j
′ then
6: let a
(θ)
i be such an ad with largest i
7: add a
(θ)
i to X
8: end if
9: if exists matched ad a
(θ)
i such that M(a
(θ)
i ) > j
′ then
10: let a
(θ)
i be such an ad with smallest i
11: add a
(θ)
i to X
12: end if
13: end for
14: for i′ ∈ X do
15: if i′ /∈ B and either i′ /∈ P or i′’ current slack in P is > (vi′,j′ − ui′ − αj′) then
16: update the priority of i′ using (i′, j′) or set if i′ /∈ P
17: end if
18: end for
Lemma 3.3. There can be at most n+ k ads in P at any given point in time.
Proof. Notice that the the only edges (i′, j′) that we consider in Line 16 are either to a
matched node in M or to the heighest unmatched ad of each type. There are exactly j < n
matched ads in phase j and there are k ad types, so the lemma follows.
Lemma 3.4. UpdatePossibleNewEdges considers only O(k) edges when updating P
and these are the only edges we need to look at.
Proof. The reason why we can focus just on the edges in Line 14 has already been explained
in the description of the algorithm UpdatePossibleNewEdges, so we only need to argue
about their number. Clearly, each ad type generated at most three ads into X , thus, the
number of edges considered when updating P is at most 3k.
3.2 Large Number of Ad Types
When k = n, Algorithm 1 is no faster than running the standard Hungarian algorithm. The
following lemma shows that this is to be expected as any instance of the assignment problem
can be reduced to an instance where all ads agree on the order of the slots.
Lemma 3.5. With k = n ad types, the problem is no easier to solve than the assignment
problem, even with monotone discount curves.
Proof. We’ll reduce to the assignment problem. Given an instance of the assignment problem
(with positive edge values), let v∗ = 1+max(i,j)∈E vij , indicate one of the sides of the bipartite
12
graph as the slots, and choose an order σ. For all incident edges to the lowest slot, add 0
to the edge. For the second to last edge, add v∗ to the edge, for the third to last edge
add 2v∗, and so on. The value of any perfect matching has increased by m(m−1)
2
v∗, which
is a constant. So the solution to the optimal perfect matching is the same as the original
problem. Note that now for each ad, the slots are monotonically decreasing according to
order σ, so for each ad there’s a decomposition into a base value, and a discount for each
slot which is monotonically decreasing.
3.3 Computing VCG Prices
Algorithm 1 gives us a fast way to compute the optimal allocation for the Ad Types problem.
The VCG mechanism [42, 7, 21] can be use to compute corresponding incentive compatible
prices, by running the allocation algorithm n+1 times, for a total running time of O(n3(k+
log n)). In this section we show that in fact we can compute VCG prices in asymptotically
identical time to solving the allocation problem once: O(n2(k + log n)). It is a folk theorem
that an instance of the assignment problem can be priced in asymptotically the same time as
solving the assignment problem (namely O(n3) for balanced bipartite graphs); this section
shows that our improved running time carries over as well.
We begin with the well-known fact (e.g. [10, Chapter 15]) that VCG prices and buyer
utilities are feasible (and optimal) dual variables for the assignment problem. Additionally,
the VCG prices correspond to the point-wise lowest possible dual variables for the slots over
all feasible solutions to the dual. Thus, we can find VCG prices by finding the lowest dual
variables.
Theorem 3.6. Given an instance (U, V, E) of the assignment problem, along with an optimal
matchingM , and shadow prices p. Algorithm 3 computes VCG prices in O(|E|+|V |·log |E|)
time.
Proof. Algorithm 3 is similar to a single “phase” of Algorithm 1. To find ∆ we use a
Fibonnacci heap on the edges where (i ∈ R, r 6∈ R) or (i 6∈ R, r ∈ R). During each while
loop, we mark at least one slot as immutable, so the total number running time to find ∆
over the entire algorithm is O(|V | log |E|).
The alternating BFS trees can only touch each edge ones over the course of all itera-
tions, hence the total time this takes is bounded by O(|E|), finally each node is marked as
immutable at most once, hence the total time over all iterations of line 6 is O(|V |). This
yields total running time of O(|E| + |V | log |E|) as claimed. Note that no price could be
lower, since all nodes either have price 0 or lowering their price would violate a slackness
constraint. Thus, the dual variables for the slot correspond to VCG prices.
Corollary 3.7. Given an instance of the Ad Types problem, we can compute the optimal
allocation and VCG prices in O(n2(k + logn)) time.
Proof. By theorem 3.1 we can compute an optimal allocation in O(n2(k + log n)) time.
By Theorem 3.6 and since |E| = kn2, from the optimal allocation we can compute the
corresponding VCG prices in O(kn2 + n log kn) hence the total time is O(n2(k + log n)) as
claimed.
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Algorithm 3 Compute VCG prices for a given solution to an instance of the assignment
problem.
Input: U, V, E,M,p
Output: pvcg
1: Let R be the set of nodes in the matching
2: while R 6= ∅ do
3: Let ∆ = min(mini∈R pi,min(i,j)∈E,(i∈R,r 6∈R) or (i 6∈R,r∈R) vij − ui − pj)
4: Implicitly update the dual solution so that
◦ ui′′ ← ui′′ +∆ for all ads i
′′ ∈ R,
◦ pj′′ ← pj′′ −∆ for all slots j
′′ ∈ R.
5: Do alternating BFS B on tight edges from all lowest prices, i.e. the slots that have
pj = 0 or have a new tight edge to an ad outside R or the ads that have a new tight
edge to an ad outside R.
6: Mark all visited nodes in B as “immutable”, remove them from R.
7: end while
8: Explicitly update the dual variables.
9: return p
3.4 Applying Reserve Prices
Setting a reserve price, or a minimum bid, is a common way to control revenue [34]. But how
can we apply a reserve price in the ad types problem? In our setting, where we have discrete
allocation amounts (the discounts αθj for an ad of type θ), Myerson’s payment identity boils
down to determining the changepoints in the mechanism, given the other bids b−i. We
could find these changepoints by updating the bid of an advertiser while maintaining the
invariants in the Hungarian algorithm, but we present a simpler approach here that may
be of independent interest to the mechanism design community. The idea is similar to the
externality computation in VCG, but rather than removing the advertiser in the alternative
allocation, we compare against an alternative where the advertiser bids their reserve price.
Since this approach works in single-parameter environments beyond the Ad Types Prob-
lem, we use the more general notation introduced in Section 2.1. Recall that we have n
strategic agents, outcome space Ω, function xi : Ω → R from outcomes to a quantity of
“stuff”, and valuation function vi(ω) = xi(ω) · vi where we overload notation and let vi ∈ R.
Additionally, we have agent-specific reserve prices ri below which we won’t serve an agent.
Finally, we have black-box access to an algorithm X : Rn → Ω that given n bids b, yields
an outcome ω that maximizes
∑n
i=0 vi(ω), the social welfare of strategic agents.
The goal in this setting is to come up with an incentive-compatible pricing scheme to
match the social welfare-maximizing (subject to reserve prices) allocation. Due to Myerson,
we know that if we can compute the change points in the allocation function, we can recover
the (unique up to translation) pricing rule that is incentive compatible. However, generally
computing change points may be costly. The goal then is to compute incentive compatible
prices without change point computation.
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Incentive Compatible Pricing without Changepoint Computation. The algorithm
is given in Algorithm 4, where we overload X to take the bids of the set passed to it, and
we use the notation X (bi → ri, B
′
−i) to indicate applying X to the set B
′
−i plus bidder i
with their bid replaced by ri. In the traditional VCG algorithm, the buyer’s externality is
computed by removing them from the auction entirely and charging the change in utility of
the remaining buyers. The difference here is that we’re not removing the buyer, but instead
we replace their bid by the reserve price. Additionally we charge them ri per unit of stuff
they receive if they bid their reserve price. Intuitively this payment scheme corresponds to
Myerson payments, where we only explicitly compute the change point at the reserve price,
and we implicitly compute reserve prices by looking at the difference in outcomes between
bidding bi and ri.
Algorithm 4 Incentive-compatible pricing without change point computation.
Input: Set of buyers B, with bids b ∈ Rn, reserves r ∈ Rn.
Output: Outcome ω, prices pi ∈ R
n.
1: B′ ← {i ∈ B : bi ≥ ri}
2: For buyer i 6∈ B′, pi ← 0
3: ω ← X (B′)
4: for buyer i ∈ B′ do
5: SW−i(B
′)←
∑
j∈B′\{i} vj(ω)
6: ω′ ← X (bi → ri, B
′
−i)
7: SW−i(bi → ri, B
′
−i)←
∑
j∈B′\{i} vj(ω
′)
8: pi ← SW−i(bi → ri, B
′
−i)− SW−i(B
′) + xi(ω
′) · ri
9: end for
10: return (ω,p)
Myerson [34] showed that the payments that yield an incentive compatible auction are
uniquely determined given an allocation rule, up to an additive constant. Of special interest
are payments where losers pay nothing. Therefore, it suffices to show that the payments
computed by Algorithm 4 are incentive compatible and charge losers nothing to prove that
they are equivalent to applying Myerson’s payment identity. In the following let SW (B) =∑
j∈B vj · xj(ω) for ω = argmaxω∈Ω
∑
j∈B bj · xj(ω)—i.e. the social welfare of the optimal
allocation assuming bids equal values—with SW (B) = SWi(B) + SW−i(B) such that SWi
is only the contribution of i to SW (B) and SW−i(B) is the contribution of the remaining
bidders {j ∈ B : j 6= i}. Similarly, let SW (bi → ri, B−i) =
∑
j∈B vj · xj(ω
′) for ω′ =
argmaxω∈Ω ri · xi(ω) +
∑
j∈B,j 6=i bj · xj(ω) i.e. the social welfare of the optimal allocation
assuming bids equal values and bi replaced by ri, with SWi(bi → ri, B−i) and SW−i(bi →
ri, B−i) defined analogously.
Theorem 3.8. Algorithm 4 yields the unique Incentive Compatible pricing scheme for X
with eager reserves that charges losers 0.
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Proof.
ui(b−i, bi) =
{
xi(b)vi −
(
SW−i(bi → ri, B
′
−i)− SW−i(B
′) + xi(ω
′) · ri
)
if bi ≥ ri
0 otherwise
=
{
SWi(B
′)−
(
SW−i(bi → ri, B
′
−i)− SW−i(B
′) + SWi(bi → ri, B
′
−i)
)
if bi ≥ ri
0 otherwise
=
{
SW (B′)− SW (bi → ri, B
′
−i) if bi ≥ ri
0 otherwise
We treat the cases for vi < ri and vi ≥ ri separately.
If vi < ri, then ui(bi, b−i) = 0 for all bi < ri, so there’s no beneficial deviation from bi = vi
to some other bi < ri. Moreover, bidding bi > ri can only yield negative utility: first observe
that if bi = ri, it must hold that SW (B
′) ≤ SW (bi → ri, B
′
−i) by definition since the latter
is the optimal social welfare achievable (if bi = ri), hence the former can only be lower. This
implies that the utility must be non-positive for any vi ≤ ri since the value per-quantity
good is lower than if vi = ri but the price stays the same. So for vi < ri there is no beneficial
deviation.
If bi ≥ ri, notice that the term SW (bi → ri, B
′
−i) is independent of the bid of bidder
i. So the only relevant term is SW (B′). Since X compute the maximum-weight bipartite
matching given the bids, bidding vi yields the maximum utility; hence no other bid bi ≥ ri
can improve utility. Moreover, since the utility is guaranteed to be non-negative, bidding
bi < ri (which yields ui = 0) cannot increase utility.
So in all cases, a bidder maximizes their utility by bidding vi. Moreover, in both cases,
if xi(ω) = 0, the bidder pays nothing, so Algorithm 4 yields the unique incentive compatible
prices where losers pay 0.
Thus, if we use Algorithm 1 to compute the max-weight bipartite matching after applying
reserve prices, Algorithm 4 runs in O(n3(k + log n)).
Corollary 3.9. Algorithm 4 runs in O(n3(k+ logn)) for the Ad Types Problem without gap
rules.
4 The Ad Types Problem with Gap Rules
In this section we switch our attention to the full version of the Ad Types problem where
we do have gap rules. As we shall see, this problem is much harder if we do not place
any restriction on the instances. On the positive side, we show that the problem is fixed
parameter tractable on the number of ad types.
4.1 Hardness
In this subsection we prove that even approximating an optimal allocation for the Ad Types
problem with Gap Rules is hard, even when there are no discount curves.
16
Theorem 4.1. The Ad Types problem with Gap Rules hard to approximate better than k1−ǫ
for any ǫ > 0, unless P = NP, even when the discount curves of all the ad types are identically
equal to 1.
Proof. The proof reduces the Maximum Independent Set (MIS) problem to the Ad Types
problem. In the MIS problem we have a graph (V,E) and we want to find the largest subset
of vertices such that no two vertices are connected with an edge.
Given an instance of the MIS problem, we can build an instance of the Ad Types problem
as follows:
• Let the number of slots and the number ad types equal the number of vertices in the
MIS problem, i.e., k = n = |V |.
• Each ad type has exactly one ad in it, i.e., for each θl for l ∈ {1, . . . , k}, |A
θl| = 1.
• Each ad has value-per-conversion equal to 1, i.e. ∀l ∈ {1, . . . , k}, v(θl) = 1. Notice that
we dropped the subscript over v, since there is only one ad per ad type.
• The ads have no discount curves over the slots, i.e., αθl1 = . . . = α
θl
k = 1 ∀l ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
• Let G be the k × k matrix describing the gap rule. The gap between two ad types i
and j is k if (i, j) ∈ E and 0 otherwise, i.e., Gij = k if (i, j) ∈ E and Gij = 0 otherwise.
Given the construction of the gap rules, two ads can belong to a solution of the Ad Types
problem only if their corresponding vertices are not connected in G. Since all the ads have
value 1 for all the slots, a solution of the Ad Types problem represents how many ads have
been allocated. Moreover, each allocated ad contributes 1 to the wellfare objective of the
Ad Types problem so maximizing the value of the allocation for the Ad Types problem is
equivalent to maximizing the size of the correspondign independent set. Thus, the Ad Types
problems inherets the k1−ǫ hardness of approximation of MIS [24, 43] since |V | = k.
4.2 Exact Algorithm
Since the previous section shown that the Ad Types Problem with Gap Rules cannot be
solved in polynomial time, unless P = NP , here we provide a dynamic-programming based
algorithm that solves the problem exactly in exponential time.
The dynamic program has 2k dimensions. For each ad type l the dynamic program stores
(i) the number of ads of type θl that have been allocated, and (ii) the largest slot index that
an ad of type θl has been allocated.
As usual, we assume that within each ad type, the ads monotonically decrease in valua-
tion, i.e., for each θl, v
θl
1 ≥ v
θl
2 ≥ . . . ≥ v
θl
n .
In order to describe our dynamic program, we need some additional notation:
• let nθl be the number of ads allocated for the ad type θl, we denote these values with
a vector nθ = 〈nθ1, . . . , nθk〉
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• let sθl be the last slot where an ad of type θl has been allocated, we denote these values
with a vector sθ = 〈sθ1, . . . , sθk〉
• for a given vector a, let a
−l,x to denote a new vector where the lth coordinate is
replaced by x, i.e., if a = 〈a1, . . . , ak〉 then a−l,x = 〈a1, . . . , al−1, x, al+1, . . . , ak〉
Let T [nθ, sθ] be our dynamic program states, which we define to be maximum value
among allocations that assigns nθl ads of type θl with the last ad being assigned to slot s
θl.
We allow sθl to be empty (which we can denote with the special symbol ⊥) to handle the
case where nθl = 0.
To derive the recurrence for our DP formulation, let us focus on a type θl with largest
sθl value. Given that the last ad of type θl is in s
θ
l , let us denote with P (θl,n
θ, sθ) the
set of possible slots where we could have the second to last ad of type θl. If n
θ
l = 1 then
P (θl,n
θ, sθ) = {⊥}, otherwise, it contains every slot that obeys all the gap rules between
this new ad and the ads locations specified by sθ.
T [nθ, sθ] = max
j∈P (θl,nθ,sθ)
{
T [nθ
−l,nθ
l
−1
, sθ−l,j] + v
θl
nθl
· αθl
sθl
}
, where θl = max
θl
sθl (1)
The base case of the recurrence is when nθ is the all 0 vector and sθ is the all empty-
position vector. If we ever reach a state where P (θl,n
θ, sθ) = ∅ then the state is infeasible
so we set its cost to be −∞. The optimal solution will be at a state with highest value.
Theorem 4.2. The Ad Types Problem can solved optimally in O(k · n2k+1) time.
Proof. The correctness of the dynamic programming formulation follows from the fact that
for any of the states on the right hand side of (1) any allocation that is consistent to the
state can be augmented by allocating the nθlth ad of type θl to slot s
θl due to the fact that
θl has the largest s
θl value.
We only consider states where sθl ≤ n and nθl ≤ n for all types θl, so the DP table has
n2k entries. Each entry takes O(kn) time to compute (there are n possible slots in P (·) and
each one takes O(k) to check whether it obeys the gaps rules), so the total running time is
O(k · n2k+1).
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